

JCS 1907/389

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15 September 1961

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 1907/389

A Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff
(Staffed by J-4)

on

EARLY SHIPMENT OF MATERIEL TO EUROPE (C)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 13 September 1961, after making amendments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 7 of JCS 1907/389.
2. Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised pages 2621 and 2622, incorporating the amendments, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.
3. The memorandum in the Enclosure was forwarded as JCSM-625-61, dated 15 September 1961, to the Secretary of Defense.
4. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1907/389.

w/
F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

9 September 1961

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Pages 2619 - 2622, incl.

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MEMORANDUM BY THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
(Staffed by J-4)

for the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

EARLY SHIPMENT OF MATERIEL TO EUROPE (C)

1. To prepare for the Berlin contingency, it appears that action should be taken now by the Army to move materiel to Europe in anticipation of a decision by the Secretary of Defense to move additional Army divisions to Europe. 1
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5. In a memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L), dated 18 August 1961, the Army recommended that Theater Reserve No. 3 not be moved in toto to Europe at this time. 6
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10. The shipping requirement to reinforce US Army units in Europe and to move two additional divisions amounts to an estimated 42 per cent of the total shipping requirement for the round-out and a six-division force. In order to take positive action to improve the capability of units now in Europe and to prepare for the movement of additional divisions to Europe, a substantial portion of this materiel cargo, estimated to be in excess of 150,000 tons, should be shipped as soon as possible. 11
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18. At the present time, there are a number of studies under development concerning the movement of forces and materiel to Europe to improve the posture of USCINCEUR in meeting the Berlin crisis. Among these are (a) the movement of a 2-4-6 division force with air support to Europe; (b) the prepositioning of TO&E equipment for a two-division force in Europe, and (c) the movement to Europe of Theater Reserve No. 3 now stored in the CONUS.

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DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

JULY

IAFF

5. If a decision should be made to move two or more additional 1 divisions to Europe with their accompanying equipment and supplies 2 to close in Europe by 1 January 1962, the impact on US Army 3 airlift capability and on the ability of US Army 4 personnel and cargo will be enormous.

6. Pending completion and decision on the studies mentioned 7 in paragraph 4 above, the following actions should be taken now 8 by the Army to alleviate the movement and receiving problems:

a. Ship to Europe presently available materiel in the 9 CONUS for the reinforcement of US Army units in Europe and 10 a two-division force. 11

b. Determine the types and tonnages of available 12 materiel from Theater Reserve No. 3 which can be shipped 13 at the present time. As rapidly as determined, in coordina- 14 tion with CINCUSAREUR, ship this tonnage to Europe. 15

7. It is recommended that: 16

a. The memorandum in the Enclosure be forwarded to the 17 Secretary of Defense. 18

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of 19 unified or specified commands. 20

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to 21 NATO activities. 22

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US 23 Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. 24

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Early Shipment of Materiel to Europe (C)

1. A number of studies are presently being developed within the Joint Staff concerning the movement of forces and materiel to Europe to improve the posture of USCINCEUR in meeting the Berlin crisis. Recommendations in connection with these studies will be submitted to you as they are completed. 1
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2. In the interim, however, we feel that there are certain actions which can be taken now in order to alleviate the movement problem when and if a decision is made to move one or two additional divisions to Europe. 6
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3. The shipping requirement to round out US Army units in Europe and to move two additional divisions amounts to an estimated 42 per cent of the total shipping requirement for the round-out and a six-division force. If positive action is to be taken to improve the capability of units now in Europe and prepare for the movement of additional divisions to Europe, the major portion of this materiel tonnage, estimated to be in excess of 150,000 short tons, should be shipped as soon as possible. Items to be shipped should be selected on the basis of maximum bulk in order to reduce follow-on shipping requirements. 10
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4. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Logistics) recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L) on 18 August 1961 that Theater Reserve No. 3, now stored in the CONUS, NOT be moved in its entirety to Europe at this time. 20
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5. If a decision is made to move additional divisions to Europe with their accompanying equipment and supplies, the impact on present sealift capability and the ability of USCINCEUR to receive personnel and cargo will be enormous. 24
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Consequently, any actions taken now to reduce this impact will 1
permit a more orderly, efficient and economical movement. 2

6. It is, therefore, recommended that the Secretary of the 3
Army be directed to move to Europe presently available material 4
in the CONUS for the US Army reinforcement units to Europe, 5
and that portion of TR 3 as determined available by the 6
Department of the Army. 7